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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND NONVERBAL EXPRESSION
It is well established that an idea conveyed by conduct-
a nonverbal expression-may be afforded protection under
the first and fourteenth amendments as a form of speech., It
is equally well established that freedom of speech is not un-
limited.2 Courts have not found it easy to determine the limi-
tations on free speech where verbal expression is concerned3
1 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559 (1965); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940); Strom-
berg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). See generally McKay,
Protest and Dissent: Action and Reaction, 1966 UTAH L. REV.
20, 29; 34 FoRDAmU L. REV. 717 (1966).
2 See, .e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
3 See, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
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When nonverbal expression is introduced the problem becomes
even more difficult.
The case of People v. StreetO is typical of several recent
cases which have dealt with this problem.5 In Street the defen-
dant, after hearing that James Meredith had been shot by a
sniper in Mississippi, stepped upon a street corner and stated
that "[i]f they allow that to happen to Meredith we don't need
an American flag."" In a public display of protest and indigna-
tion he then ignited an American flag. The defendant was sub-
sequently arrested, tried and convicted under a New York
statute which made it a crime to "publicly mutilate" the flag.7
On appeal the defendant advanced the argument that his
act was symbolic speech, a protest against the inhumane treat-
ment of a civil rights worker. Under these circumstances the
application of the flag law would result in punishment in con-
travention of his constitutionally protected freedom of speech.8
The court rejected this theory and affirmed the conviction. It
Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877 (1963); Lusk, The Present
Status of the "C~ear and Present Danger Test"-A Brief
History and Some Observations, 45 Ky. L. J. 576 (1957).
4 28 App. Div. 2d 734, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S. 2d 491 (1967).
5 See United States v. Smith, 368 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1966).
6229 N.E.2d at 189, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
7 N. Y. Gm Bus. LAw § 136 (d) (McKinney Supp. 1967), form-
.erly N. Y. PmAL LAw § 1425 (16) (d) (McKinney 1944). All
fifty states have laws similar to the New York statute. People
v. Street, 229 N.E.2d 187, 190, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491, 495 (1967).
Most of these statutes provide that one who mutilates a flag
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. After the rash of flag
burnings in 1967, the Oklahoma legislature made such an
act a felony punishable by a fine of three thousand dollars,
or three years imprisonment, or both. Ch. 298, [1967] Okla.
Laws 481, amending OKLA. STAT. tit 21, §§ 372-73 (1961).
8 Similar arguments have been advanced by defendants in
the much publicized draft card burning cases. See cases
cited note 5 supra. See also McKay, supra note 1.
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quoted Halter v. Nebraska9 : "insults to a flag have been the
cause of war, and indignities put upon it, in the presence of
those who revere it, have often been resented and sometimes
punished on the spot." Street's conduct was characterized as
"an act of incitement, literally and figuratively 'incendiary'
and as fraught with danger to the public peace as if he had
stood upon the street corner shouting epithets at passing
pedestrians." 10 Thus the court rested its decision on the fact
that the burning of an American flag might have resulted in
a breach of the public peace. The state could legitimately pro-
scribe such conduct in the interest of the public "peace, secur-
ity and well being" of its citizens.1
The court reached the correct decision in the Street case.
However, the persuasiveness of the decision was unnecessarily
weakened by the court's reliance upon its assertion that the
conduct might have resulted in a breach of the public peace.
If it be said that the burning of the flag is nonverbal expres-
sion, then, arguably, the mere fact that it might have resulted
in a breach of the peace would not seem to be so compelling
a reason as to justify criminal punishment. In fact, Street's act
did not cause a breach of the peace.12 The Supreme Court in
Edwards v. South Carolina'3 noted that because expression
may "stir people to anger" or brings "about a condition of un-
0 229 N.E.2d at 190, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 495, quoting Halter v.
Nebraska, 205 U.S. 24, 41 (1906).
10 229 N.E.2d at 191, 282 N.Y.S. 2d at 495.
11 Id. at 190, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
12 The New York court did not find this fact persuasive. In
cases involving the first amendment and breaches of peace,
the Supreme Court often emphasizes that no breach actually
occurred. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 872 U.S. 229,
236 (1963).
13 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). (indeed, "... a function of free speech
is to invite dispute. It may . best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger ....
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rest" is not sufficient reason to sustain a criminal conviction
and thereby abridge freedom of expression.
Moreover, without questioning the assertion that such an
act might result in violence,14 how would this reasoning work
in a case where the act is criminal, but no such assertion can
reasonably be made? For example, in Oklahoma it is a crime
to destroy state property."; If an individual, motivated as was
the defendant in Street, publicly burns some insignificant piece
of property, such as a ball-point pen, in protest of waste in state
government, it would be unreasonable to argue that such a
nonverbal expression rMight result in a breach of the peace.
On the other hand it would be unreasonable to argue that the
state could not punish an individual for such an act.
Indeed, the state can punish a person for destroying state
property, or for burning a flag, if those acts are made criminal
by the legislature. That type of conduct can be punished re-
gardless of the "symbolic significance" ascribed to it by the
individual. The court in Street observed this principle when it
said that the first and fourteenth amendments protect the
"substance rather than the form of communication".10
In Cox v. LouisianaN7 the Supreme Court said that the first
and fourteenth amendments do not "afford the same kind of
That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute ... is
nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment,
unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger
of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public in-
convenience, annoyance, or unrest.") In Street the court
did not specifically mention the "clear and present danger"
test as developed by the Supreme Court.
14 Where freedom of speech is involved it would seem that such
an assertion would involve an examination of the duty of
those persons who witness such an act to refrain from vio-
lence. See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195 (1966).
15 See, OKLA. STAT. tit 21, § 1760 (1961).
16 229 N.E.2d at 190, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
17 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
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